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Abstract
The reaction of hours worked to technology shocks represents a key con-
troversy between RBC and New Keynesian explanations of the business
cycle. It sparked a large empirical literature with contrasting results. We
demonstrate that, with a more general and data coherent supply and pro-
duction framework (“normalized” factor-augmenting CES technology), both
models can plausibly generate impacts of either sign. We develop analytical
expressions to establish the threshold between positive and negative contem-
poraneous correlations for both models. These will crucially depend on the
factor-augmentation nature of the shock, the elasticity of factor substitution,
the capital income share, and the reaction of consumption. The impact of
technology on hours can thus hardly be taken as evidence in support of any
particular business-cycle model. Our results are also important as: i) we
introduce the concept of normalization for DSGE models and, ii) they may
help interpret possible time-variation in technology and hours correlations
over time.
JEL Classification: E32, E23, E25.
Keywords: Technology Shocks, Hours Worked, RBC and NK models, Nor-
malization, Factor Substitution, Factor Bias.
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Non-technical Summary
A key question for understanding the sources of business cycle fluctuations is
whether the impact of a productivity shock is expansionary or contractionary for
employment in the short-run. The standard tenet has it that, in flexible price
models of fluctuations (RBC), productivity changes (driven by technology shocks)
increase employment (hours worked) on impact. On the other hand, models with
price rigidities (NK) imply that technology shocks reduce hours on impact as
firms cannot accommodate the excess output by reducing prices. This dichotomy
generated a large empirical literature with contrasting results. Researchers try to
identify technology shocks and then analyze their correlation with hours worked
in the short-run to discriminate between business cycle models.
Practically all models in both the RBC and NK variants assume that, in the
face of a change in relative factor productivity (and factor prices) the economy
substitutes capital and labor one for one, as is the case in the well known Cobb-
Douglas production function. However, the existing evidence emphatically rejects
this assumption: the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is sub-
stantially less than one, making capital and labor gross complements. We thus
argue that it is not satisfactory to use Cobb-Douglas in macroeconomic models
and propose the introduction of a more flexible Constant Elasticity of Substitu-
tion (CES) production function where factor substitution can range from zero to
infinity. This introduces the possibility that technology shocks are non-neutral:
in the short-run shocks may “favor” some factors in the sense that their relative
marginal product and their share in the economy’s income increases. Hence, we
re-state a widely used result in growth theory that technology shocks can be either
capital or labor saving.
We then analyze the impact of technology shocks on hours worked using this
more general and data coherent supply and production framework. We demon-
strate that introducing CES supply with differing substitution possibility requires
“normalization” for the calibration of dynamic general equilibrium models, and
propose a simple yet robust way of calibrating the normalized supply side. We
then show that, in the standard RBC model, capital-augmenting shocks yield pos-
itive hours responses, whilst labor-augmenting shocks can lead to either response
sign. In the standard NK model, however, labor-augmenting shocks yield negative
responses and capital-augmenting shocks were ambiguous. We conclude that the
impact of technology shocks on hours worked can hardly be taken as evidence in
support of any particular business-cycle model.
More generally, we derived threshold rules for the determination of the technology-
hours sign on impact. In each model and shock case, we showed that there exists
some factor substitution value whereby a given technology-hours impact changed
sign. The key margins - other than the substitution elasticity itself and the factor
bias of technology shocks - are the capital share, risk aversion, and the marginal
propensity to consume. The latter essentially boils down to how persistent shocks
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are and the strength of investment adjustment costs. These margins are then
interpreted using a simple labor supply and demand framework.
Our threshold rules may help shed light on possible time-variation in the hours-
technology correlation. This is potentially a useful insight since much of the lit-
erature appears motivated by concerns of statistical fit rather than uncovering
the underlying economic mechanisms. In our analysis, time variations may result
from (i) time variation in the relative intensity of labor and capital augmenting
shocks and (ii) time-variations in parameters (the substitution elasticity being
prime among them).
Our analysis may also open important new avenues for research. For instance,
if it is not satisfactory for business-cycle models to assume unitary factor substitu-
tion, the practice implemented here of appropriately normalizing the supply side
for calibration of DSGE models should become standard and related sensitivities
analyzed. Moreover, although theoretical, our results can have empirical implica-
tions. We might, for instance, be able to exploit changes in factor income shares
to identify different sorts of technology shocks in modeling and SVAR analysis.
The models presented here can also serve as a benchmark to study the business
cycle properties of movements in factor shares.
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1 Introduction
The reaction of hours worked to a technology shock has been a key controversy
in macroeconomics over the last decade. According to the standard real business
cycle (RBC) model, hours worked should rise after a (positive) productivity shock.
However, in an influential paper, Gal´ı (1999), using a structural VAR (SVAR)
with long-run restrictions, found the impact to be negative. This evidence has
since been interpreted as favoring the New-Keynesian (NK) sticky-price model of
business-cycle fluctuations.1
Subsequent literature was mostly supportive of a negative correlation between
technology and hours.2 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003), though,
challenged these results arguing that they were driven by the way researchers
treat hours worked; using hours on a per capita basis, they found a positive hours-
technology short run correlation.3
Econometric identification, hence, took center stage in the debate. Fernald
(2007) emphasized the importance of low-frequency trend-breaks in productivity
and found a negative but time-varying impact of technology on hours. Dedola
and Neri (2007) use sign restrictions for VAR identification and found that hours
worked are likely to increase. Uhlig (2004), using a medium-run identification
scheme, also finds support for a mildly positive impact. Pesavento and Rossi
(2005), use an agnostic method that does not require choosing between a specifi-
cation in levels or in first differences, found that hours fall after a technology shock,
but that the effect is short lived. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008), however,
maintain that SVAR models are incapable of distinguishing between different ex-
planations of the business cycle (i.e. RBC vs. sticky prices). They argue that,
if non-technology shocks account for an important part of business-cycle fluctua-
tions, SVAR models can erroneously favor a NK model when the data has been
generated using an RBC model. The method proposed in the influential paper
by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), though, is free from the shortcomings of
the SVAR identification restrictions. They derive a measure of aggregate tech-
nology change from sectoral-level data and found technological change and factor
inputs to be negatively correlated. They conclude that technology improvements
1It is well known that a standard RBC model could also generate a negative technology-hours
response if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is sufficiently high (above unity). Rotemberg
(2003) also showed that an RBC model with protracted technical diffusion could generate a
negative technology-hours correlation. In the NK case, the presence of various rigidities (the
most popular of which is price staggering) tends to imply that aggregate demand grows by less
than the growth in technology prompting an initial reduction in employment. See Gal´ı (2008)
and Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004) for thorough discussions. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) and Tovar
(2008) provide effective discussions and analysis of modern DSGE models.
2E.g., Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2003) and the references therein.
3See Whelan (2009) for a further discussion of the Gal´ı (1999)-Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Vigfusson (2003) debate.
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are contractionary on impact. Finally, recent work is suggestive of a time-varying
correlation, e.g., Gal´ı and Gambetti (2009).4
The effect of technical change on employment is, in fact, a long-standing de-
bate in economics - see, for example Wicksell (1911)’s discussion of the historical
“machinery question”. The traditional Ricardian effect - defended by Hicks (1969)
- supported the idea that technological advancement reduces employment in the
short run, but increases it in the long run.5 The kind of mechanism envisaged,
however, did not rest on the introduction of nominal rigidities that characterizes
much of modern macroeconomics. It relied on aspects of the production process
such as the degree to which different factors substitute or complement one another,
and the extent to which technical change is non neutral.
Modern business cycle models, though, have generally abstracted from these
aspects.6 They tend to impose aggregate (unitary elasticity) Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction which is both highly restrictive and uninformative regarding biases in tech-
nical change. The choice may be considered startling given the avowed interest
of the literature in promoting (or testing) the cyclical importance of “technology”
shocks. In that light, our work may be considered as synthesizing developments in
production/growth theory - where non-unitary substitution elasticities and factor-
augmenting technology shocks are relied upon to describe various economic phe-
nomena (e.g., Acemoglu (2009)) - with developments in dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models used to explain business cycle patterns and inform policy.
Indeed, there is now mounting evidence that aggregate production may be bet-
ter characterized by a non-unitary substitution elasticity; the evidence in Klump,
McAdam and Willman (2007) and Chirinko (2008) suggests 0.4-0.6 as a bench-
mark range for the US. Along these lines, Jones (2003, 2005) argued that capital
shares exhibit such protracted swings and trends in many countries as to be in-
consistent with Cobb-Douglas (see also Blanchard (1997), McAdam and Willman
(2008)).7 Moreover, as Acemoglu (2009, chap. 15) points out, there is little reason
4Alexopoulos (2010) pursues a novel approach: using an index of information technology
publications, she finds that output and (albeit to a small extent) employment rise following a
technology shock.
5This is in contrast to Marxian theories that supported the existence of permanent (negative)
effects on employment (see Beach (1971) for a discussion).
6Francis and Ramey (2005) can be credited with noting that hours fall in response to a
labor-saving technology shock in an RBC model in the limit case of (albeit non-normalized)
Leontief technology. Although at business-cycle frequencies low substitution elasticities might
be expected, zero factor substitution is a strong assumption with the counter-factual implication
that shares of capital and labor in output approach one-half. Furthermore, in the technology and
growth literature, the Leontief form is usually ruled out given its dis-equilibrium implications for
growth and optimal savings, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
7Jones (2003, 2005) model provides an explanation for the existence of an aggregate produc-
tion function that exhibits a (far) less than unitary substitution elasticity over business-cycle
frequencies but asymptotes to Cobb-Douglas in the long-run.
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to suppose that, over business-cycle frequencies, technical change will be neutral
or embody balanced growth: technical change typically benefits some factors and
some agents more than others.
When investigating the ramifications of a non-unitary substitution elasticity
and factor-augmenting technology shocks in dynamic macro-models one neces-
sarily faces the issue of normalization (following the seminal contribution by
La Grandville (1989b) and subsequent work by Klump and de La Grandville (2000)
and Leo´n-Ledesma, McAdam and Willman (2010)). This is an aspect that is not
yet widely known, and certainly not known in the DSGE context. Normaliza-
tion essentially implies representing the supply side of the model (i.e., production
function and factor demands) in consistent indexed number form. In our context,
normalization turns out to be absolutely crucial to ensure the validity of compara-
tive statics, and for meaningful and consistent calibration of the deep parameters
of the supply side of the model.8
Accordingly, while remaining agnostic about empirical identification methods,
we generalize the supply side of both standard RBC and NK models. In doing so,
we demonstrate that both models can yield positive or negative responses of hours
worked to technology shocks. Importantly, these responses are also empirically
plausible given the existing estimates of the relevant parameters. We further derive
threshold rules for the sign of this response. We explain the intuition behind these
rules and carry out a comprehensive robustness analysis. This threshold rule may
further help interpret the time variation in technology-hours correlations that some
researchers report.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the importance
of normalization alongside biased technical change in the more general Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. Sections 3 and 4 present the
RBC and NK models. Section 5 discusses the calibration and presents some key
simulation results. Section 6 derives threshold rules (general and simplified) deter-
mining the sign of the response of hours to technology shocks. Section 7 interprets
that rule in a more intuitive context through the lens of shifts in labor demand
and supply. Section 8 presents some robustness analysis. Section 9 discusses pos-
sible time variation in the technology-hours impact. Finally, section 10 concludes.
The paper is complemented by a technical appendix where we present extensive
numerical analysis, robustness analysis, and the derivation of the threshold rules
under different types of preferences.
8As far as we know, ours is the first attempt to incorporate and consistently implement
normalized supply into fully-fledged dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
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2 The Normalized CES Production Function
The technology assumption adopted by modern business cycle models has almost
exclusively been Cobb Douglas. This functional form constrains the substitu-
tion elasticity between factors of production to unity and is unable to separately
identify capital and labor augmenting technology shocks. The more general CES
production function, by contrast, nests Cobb-Douglas as a special case and admits
the possibility of neutral and non-neutral productivity changes.
2.1 Normalization
At a simple level, one can think of normalization as removing the problem that
arises from the fact that labor and capital are measured in different units - although
its importance goes well beyond that. Under Cobb-Douglas, normalization plays
no role since, due to its multiplicative form, differences in units are absorbed by
the scaling constant. The CES function, by contrast, is highly non-linear, and so,
unless correctly normalized, out of its three key parameters - the efficiency param-
eter, the distribution parameter and the substitution elasticity - only the latter is
deep. The other two parameters turn out to be affected by the size of the substi-
tution elasticity and factor income shares. Accordingly: i) if one is interested in
model sensitivity with respect to production parameters (as here), normalization
is essential to have interpretable comparisons; and ii) without a proper normaliza-
tion, nothing ensures that factor shares equal the distribution parameter, hence
invalidating inference based on impulse-response functions (IRFs).
Let us start with the general definition of a linear homogenous production
function:
Yt = F
(
ΓKt Kt,Γ
H
t Ht
)
= ΓHt Htf (κt) (1)
where Yt is output, Kt capital and Ht the labor input. The terms Γ
K
t and Γ
H
t cap-
ture capital and labor-augmenting technical progress, respectively. To circumvent
problems related to the “Diamond-McFadden impossibility theorem”,9 researchers
usually assume specific functional forms for these functions, e.g., Γjt = Γ
j
0e
zjt where
zjt can be a stochastic or deterministic technical progress function associated to
factor i.
The case where zKt = z
H
t > 0 denotes Hicks-Neutral technology; z
K
t > 0,
zHt = 0 yields Solow-Neutrality; z
K
t = 0, z
H
t > 0 represents Harrod-Neutrality;
and zKt > 0 6= z
H
t > 0 indicates general factor-augmentation. The term κt =(
ΓKt Kt
)
/
(
ΓHt Ht
)
is the capital-labor ratio in efficiency units. Likewise define
ϕt = yt/
(
ΓHt Ht
)
as per-capita production in efficiency units.
9See Diamond and McFadden (1965), Diamond, McFadden and Rodriguez (1978).
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The elasticity of substitution can then be expressed as:
σ = −
f ′ (κ) [f (κ)− κf ′ (κ)]
κf (κ) f ′′ (κ)
∈ [0,∞]. (2)
This definition can be viewed as a second-order differential equation in κ having
the following general CES production function as its solution:
ϕt = a
[
κ
σ−1
σ
t + b
] σ
σ−1
⇒ Yt = a
[(
ΓKt Kt
)σ−1
σ + b
(
ΓHt Ht
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(3)
where a and b are two arbitrary constants of integration with the following corre-
spondence with the original Arrow et al. (1961) non-normalized form, which, after
some rearrangements can be presented in conventional form:
Yt = J
[
α
(
ΓKt Kt
)σ−1
σ + (1− α)
(
ΓHt Ht
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(4)
where efficiency parameter J = a (1 + b)
σ
σ−1 and distribution parameter α =
1/ (1 + b) < 1.
An economically meaningful identification of these integration constants a and
b (and further J and α) is given by the fact that σ is a point elasticity relying
on three baseline (or “normalized”, t = 0) values: a given capital intensity κ0 =
ΓK0 K0/
(
ΓH0 H0
)
, a given marginal rate of substitution, ∂(Y0/H0)
∂(Y0/K0)
, and a given level
of per-capita production ϕ0 = Y0/
(
ΓH0 H0
)
. For simplicity, and without loss of
generality, we scale the components of technical progress such that ΓK0 = Γ
H
0 = 1.
Accordingly, we can transform (4) into the key normalized form,
Yt = Y0
[
α0
(
Kt
K0
ΓKt
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− α0)
(
Ht
H0
ΓHt
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(5)
where distribution parameter α0 = r0K0/ (r0K0 + w0H0) has a clear economic
interpretation: the capital income share evaluated at the point of normalization.
We see that all parameters of (5) are deep, demonstrated by the fact that at the
point of normalization, the left-hand-side equals the right-hand side for all values
of σ, α0 and the parameterization of Γ
K
t and Γ
H
t .
By contrast, comparing (4) with (5), the parameters of the non-normalized
function depend on the normalized value of the factors and the factor returns as
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well as on the σ value itself:
J (σ, ·) = Y0
[
r0K
1/σ
0 + w0H
1/σ
0
r0K0 + w0H0
] σ
σ−1
(6)
α (σ, ·) =
r0K
1/σ
0
r0K
1/σ
0 + w0H
1/σ
0
. (7)
Accordingly, in the non-normalized formulation, parameters J and α have no
theoretical or empirical meaning. Hence, varying σ, whilst holding J and α con-
stant, is inconsistent for comparative-static purposes. Each of the resulting CES
functions goes through different fixed points and we can say that each resulting
CES function belongs to “different families”, La Grandville (2009).
Since, in the non-normalized case, parameter α depends on the point of nor-
malization as well as on σ, it is obvious that the dynamic responses to shocks can
change as we vary σ, since the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labor
will change. This will, as we shall see later, turn out to be a crucial parameter
for the determination of the response of hours. That is, by changing σ we would
also be changing the capital and labor intensities. Also, parameter α in a non-
normalized CES will not match the capital share. Hence, in a calibrated dynamic
simulation we would not be controlling for this important parameter, rendering
IRFs invalid. In our general equilibrium setting, we are interested in the dynamic
responses of variables in a stationary model. Hence, we need to ensure that factor
shares in steady state (the initial and end point of our simulations) are constant
and equal to α0 and 1− α0. Also, output, capital, labor, consumption and factor
payments are common at this point for different σ’s. We hence choose to make
the steady state our normalization point.
A logical way to proceed is then to choose a steady state and then calibrate
the model using this as the normalization point. We can, for instance, set Y0 and
H0 to 1. Since the real interest rate is determined by preferences and depreciation,
we can then, given the income/factor income identity,
Y0︸︷︷︸
=1
≡ r0K0︸ ︷︷ ︸
α0
+ w0H0︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−α0
(8)
define the steady-state capital stock as K∗ = α0/r0, where α0 and r0 are the
capital income share and real interest rate at the chosen steady-state. The real
normalized/steady-state wage is solved as w∗ = 1 − α0. This ensures that the
model is consistent, so factor shares sum to one and consumption plus investment
equals output.
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2.2 CES Production and Factor-Augmenting Technology
The CES production function, (4) or (5), nests Cobb-Douglas when σ → 1; the
Leontief function (i.e., fixed factor proportions) when σ → 0; and a linear produc-
tion function (i.e., perfect factor substitutes) when σ →∞. Although factors are
always substitutes, the higher is σ the greater the similarity between capital and
labor. Thus, when σ < 1, we say that factors are gross complements in production
and gross substitutes when σ > 1 (La Grandville (1989a), Acemoglu (2002)).
In business-cycle models factor substitutability and non-neutral technical change
will matter in so far as they influence developments in output, relative prices, fac-
tor intensities, income shares and cost pressures. Movements in these variables
affect the inter-temporal decisions of consumers and firms. Some indications of
the key role played by factor substitution can be gauged from the following.
Assuming competitive markets and profit maximization, relative factor income
shares and relative marginal products are (dropping time subscripts and abstract-
ing from normalization):
Θ =
rK
wH
=
α
1− α
(
ΓKK
ΓNH
)σ−1
σ
(9)
ι =
FK
FH
=
α
1− α
[(
K
H
)− 1
σ
(
ΓK
ΓH
)σ−1
σ
]
(10)
It is straightforward to show that the effect of technical bias and capital deepen-
ing on factor income shares and relative factor prices is related to whether factors
are gross complements or gross substitutes:
sign
{
∂ι
∂ (ΓK/ΓH)
}
, sign
{
∂Θ
∂ (K/H)
}
, sign
{
∂Θ
∂ (ΓK/ΓH)
}
= sign {σ − 1} (11)
Hence, an increase in factor J−augmenting (J = K,H) technical change“favors”
factor J (i.e., implying Fj > Fi6=j and raising J ’s income share for given factor pro-
portions) if factors are gross substitutes (σ > 1). The effects reverse if factors are
gross complements. Thus, it is only in the gross-substitutes case that a factor
J -augmenting change in technology is J -biased. Naturally, the relations between
the substitution elasticity, technical bias and factor shares evaporate under Cobb-
Douglas: factor income shares are time-invariant and relative factor prices are
purely determined by capital deepening.
Equations (9)-(11) illustrate the importance of factor substitution and technical
bias. Namely that the impact of technology shocks on factor payments depends
on the substitution elasticity and the factor bias of the shock. This influences the
14
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dynamic response of interest and wages (and hence hours) to technology shocks.
Note, though, statement (11) defines factor demand reactions to technology
changes. They therefore abstract from labor-supply reactions. However, our anal-
ysis - in the following sections - suggests that the conclusions concerning factor
shares do not change with endogenous labor supply. Although the corresponding
conclusion concerning relative factor prices - Fj > Fi - need no longer hold.
3 The Real Business Cycle model
The standard RBC model is a variant of the representative agent neoclassical
model, where business cycles are due to non-monetary sources (primarily, changes
in technology). The model is well known and can therefore be introduced com-
pactly. The standard model with CES production technology in the supply side is
given by (for expositional simplicity we omit the expectations operator):
C−σct = βC
−σc
t+1 [1 + rt+1 − δ] (12)
wt = υH
γ
t C
σc
t (13)
Yt = CESt = Y0e
zHt
[
α0(
Kt−1
K0
ez
K
t )
σ−1
σ + (1− α0)(
Ht
H0
ez
H
t )
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(14)
wt = (1− α0)
(
Y0
H0
ez
H
t ez
H
t
)σ−1
σ
(
Yt
Ht
) 1
σ
(15)
rt = α0
(
Y0
K0
ez
H
t ez
K
t
)σ−1
σ
(
Yt
Kt−1
) 1
σ
(16)
Ct +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 ≤ Yt (17)
zjt = ρz
j
t−1 + ε
j
t (18)
where Ct, wt and rt are, respectively, real consumption, real wages and the real
interest rate. Parameters β, δ and υ represent, respectively, the discount factor,
the capital depreciation rate and a scaling constant. zjt are technology shocks
for j = K,H,H (i.e., capital-augmenting, labor-augmenting, and Hicks-neutral
shocks respectively). Equations (12) and (13) represent the household’s optimal
15
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consumption and labor supply choices given the following utility function,10
Ut =
C1−σct
1− σc
− υ
H1+γt
1 + γ
(19)
where σc is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and γ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity. Solving equation (13) for hours demonstrates that, after a shock, hours
rise if real wages grow faster than consumption. Equations (14) to (16) are the
CES production function and its factor derivatives in normalized form. Equation
(17) is the resource constraint. Equation (18) shows that technology shocks are
assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
The model could straightforwardly be expanded to contain monopolistic com-
petition and investment adjustment costs as in the NK model discussed below. In
the limiting case of fully-flexible prices the NK model would encompass that more
generalized RBC version as a special case. The importance of these limiting cases
comparisons becomes clear from section 6 onwards.
4 The New Keynesian Model
The NK model builds on the RBC framework with the addition of monopolis-
tic competition, nominal rigidities, investment adjustment costs and a monetary
policy rule.
4.1 Households
As before, the representative household maximizes utility function, (19) supple-
mented by (separable) real money balances mt,
Ut =
C1−σct
1− σc
− υ
H1+γt
1 + γ
+̥ (mt) (20)
with ̥′ > 0,̥′′ < 0. The consumption good is assumed to be a composite
good produced with a continuum of differentiated goods, Ci,t, i ∈ [0, 1], via the
aggregator function:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
C
1− 1
η
i,t di
] 1
1− 1η
(21)
10We employ separable utility which makes our analysis more general. Non-separable prefer-
ences are examined in Appendix B.
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where η represents the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution across different
varieties of consumption goods. To find total consumption demand for each variety
i, one can solve the standard problem of minimizing total cost subject to (21),
which yields the downward sloped demand function:
Cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ct (22)
where Pt is the nominal price index given by:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηit di
] 1
1−η
(23)
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal state-
contingent assets. The household maximizes (19) subject to a sequence of flow
budget constraints given by,
qtbt +mt + Ct + It =
bt−1 +mt−1
πt
+ wtHt + r
K
t Kt−1 +Πt (24)
where bt represents the quantity of one-period nominally riskless discount bonds
(or any one-period claim) purchased (or issued) in period t and maturing in period
t+ 1. Each bond pays one unit of money at maturity and its price is qt. Because
1− qt corresponds to the nominal loss of purchasing one unit of money instead of
purchasing bonds the equality qt = R
−1
t must hold, where Rt is the gross nominal
interest rate. Variable It is investment, r
K
t the rental price of the capital stock,
πt =
Pt
Pt−1
is the gross inflation rate and Πt denotes profits received from the
ownership of firms.
The resource constraint is,
Ct + It ≤ Yt (25)
and capital accumulation is given by,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It
[
1−
ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
(26)
Changes in the capital stock are thus assumed to be subject to a convex adjustment
cost with ψ > 0.
We assume the investment good It to be a composite made of the aggregator
function type (21). Hence, investment demand for each variety has the same form
as the consumption function: Iit = (Pit/Pt)
−η It.
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The household chooses Ct, bt,Ht,Kt, It, andmt to maximize utility (19) subject
to (24), (26) and the no-Ponzi-game constraint. Letting λt and λtqt denote the
Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (24) and (26), respectively, yields,
∞∑
t=0
βt

[
C1−σct
1−σc
− υ
H1+γt
1+γ
+̥ (mt)
]
+λt
[
wtHt + r
K
t Kt−1 − Ct − It −R
−1
t bt −mt +
bt−1+mt−1
pit
+Πt
]
+λtqt
[
(1− δ)Kt−1 + It
(
1− ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
−Kt
]

(27)
The first-order conditions are:
C−σct = λt (28)
λt = βRt
λt+1
πt+1
(29)
wt = υ
Hγt
λt
(30)
λtqt = βλt+1
[
rkt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
]
(31)
λt = λtqt
[
1−
ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− ψ
It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)]
+ βψλt+1qt+1
(
It+1
It
)2(
It+1
It
− 1
)
(32)
̥
′ = λt − β
λt+1
πt+1
(33)
The last condition determines the demand for money function. However, in the
current framework, with a Taylor-rule based monetary policy (described below),
money demand is purely recursive.
4.2 Firms
We assume that single firms operating in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment and produce one good of variety i. The firm does so by using capital and
labor following a production technology:
ez
H
t F (ez
K
t Kit, e
zHt Hit)− χ (34)
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where the F is the same normalized CES production function presented before and
χ represents fixed costs in production.11 Given the consumption and investment
demand functions, aggregate demand for good i will then be given by:
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt (35)
Real profits for firm i expressed in terms of the composite good are,
Πit =
Pit
Pt
Yit − r
K
t Kit−1 − wtHit (36)
We assume, as usual in this literature, that firms rent labor and capital services
from a centralized market and that capital input can be readily reallocated across
industries. The objective of the firm is to choose the plan Hit, Kit−1 and pit, so
as to maximize the present discounted value of the profit stream assuming that
the firm satisfies demand at the posted price subject to the production function
constraint. Hence,
∞∑
s=t
R−1t,sPs
{
Πis +mcis
[
ez
H
t F (ez
K
t Kit−1, e
zHt Hit)− χ− Yis
]}
(37)
where Rt,s =
s∏
τ=t
Rτ with Rt,t = 1 and Rt,t+1 = Rt. Variable mcit is the Lagrange
multiplier related to the production function constraint. We derive the following
cost-minimization conditions with respect to labor and capital:
mcite
zHt FH(e
zKt Kit−1, e
zHt Hit) = wt (38)
mcite
zHt FK(e
zKt Kit−1, e
zHt Hit) = r
K
t (39)
We see that the Lagrange multiplier mcit has a clear economic interpretation, i.e.
the real marginal cost of the firm. It is also straightforward to show thatmcit is the
same for all firms i. The ratio of (38) and (39) imply that
FK (Kit−1,Hi,t)
FH(Ki,t−1,Hi,t)
=
rKt
wt
, the
right-hand-side of which is common to all firms. We know that the marginal pro-
ductivities of labor and capital for any linearly homogeneous production function
can be presented in terms of capital intensity Kit−1
Ht
and common technical progress.
11These are chosen to ensure zero profits in steady state. This in turn guarantees that there
is no incentive for other firms to enter the market in the long run. See Coenen, McAdam and
Straub (2008).
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Now common input prices imply that capital intensities and hence also marginal
productivities and marginal costs must be equal across firms, i.e. mcit = mct.
The second part of the firm’s optimization problem is to set the optimal price
level subject to Calvo pricing, where in each period the probability of re-optimizing
is 1 − θ (for simplicity, we do not assume price indexation). Therefore, utilizing
demand function (35), the Lagrangian (37) covering only those firms which are
allowed to re-optimize their price level on period t, can be transformed into,
∞∑
s=t
R−1ts Psθ
s−t

(
P˜it
Ps
)1−η
Ys − r
K
t Kit−1 − wtHit
+mcs
[
ez
H
t F (ez
K
t Kit−1, e
zHt Hit)− χ−
(
P˜it
Ps
)−η
Ys
]
 (40)
where we denote the re-optimized price level by P˜it. Maximizing (40) with respect
to P˜it yields,
∞∑
s=t
R−1ts θ
s−t
(
P˜it
Ps
)−1−η
Ys
(
mcs −
η − 1
η
P˜it
Ps
)
= 0 (41)
This expression tells us that the optimal price equals a weighed sum of future
expected mark-ups over marginal cost and that the re-optimized price level is
same for all firms, i.e. P˜it = P˜t. Utilizing (29), this condition can be expressed
recursively, by introducing two auxiliary variables x1t and x2t, as:
x1t = p˜
−1−η
t Ytmct + θβ
[
λt+1
λt
πηt+1
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−1−η
x1t+1
]
(42)
x2t = p˜
−η
t Yt + θβ
[
λt+1
λt
πη−1t+1
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−η
x2t+1
]
(43)
x2t =
η
η − 1
x1t (44)
where p˜t =
P˜t
Pt
.
4.3 Monetary authority
The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule:
log(Rt/R) = αr log(Rt−1/R) + αpi log(πt/π) + αy log(Yt/Y
f
t ) (45)
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where Rt denotes the nominal interest rate. Consistent with the DSGE model,
potential output, Y f , is defined as the level of output that would prevail under
flexible prices and wages, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007).
We also consider the responses of the economy under optimal (Ramsey) policy
according to which the monetary authority sets the optimal path of all variables
in the economy by maximizing agents’ welfare subject to the relations describing
the competitive economy, e.g., Levine, McAdam and Pearlman (2008).12
4.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Looking at expression (41) we see that all firms that are able to change their price in
a given period chose the same price so we can drop subscript i from the equilibrium
conditions. By taking into account relative price dispersion across varieties, the
resource constraint in this model is given by the following three expressions:
Yt =
1
St
[ez
H
t F (·, t)− χ] (46)
Yt = Ct + It (47)
St = (1− θ)p˜t
−η + θπηt St−1 (48)
where S is a state variable that measures the resource costs induced by the ineffi-
cient price dispersion present in the Calvo problem in equilibrium.13
5 Calibration and impulse-response analysis
Our calibration of the models reflects common practice. Table 1 reports the pa-
rameter values used for the NK model. For the RBC model we use the same
parameter values whenever they are common to both models. We set the discount
factor to represent a discount rate of around 4% per year. Utility function param-
eters are set consistent with balanced growth. The normalized capital share is set
to 0.4. The investment adjustment cost parameter is set to 2.5 (a common bench-
mark value, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). The price elasticity
of demand, η, ensures a steady-state price mark-up of 20% over marginal costs.
The depreciation rate of capital is 10% per year. The Calvo parameter implies
12These results are reported in Appendix D.
13Although this variable is redundant when there is zero steady-state inflation (see Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)), we introduce it because we also analyzed the results with positive
inflation for robustness. The results regarding the reaction of hours did not change and are
available on request.
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a fixed price duration of 4 quarters. The substitution elasticity is set to a range
from 0.4 above Leontief (i.e., at the lower end of the “Chirinko (2008) interval”),
at Cobb-Douglas, and at 0.4 above Cobb-Douglas, thus traversing gross comple-
ments and gross substitutes. The auto-regressive parameter of technology shocks
is set to 0.95. For simplicity, in our core calibration, we assume monetary policy
only responds to deviations of inflation from the steady state with a coefficient
just respecting the Taylor principle.14 Parameter v is set to equate the real wage
expressions in (13) and (15), implying v =
(1−α0)r
σc
0
(r0−δα0)
σc . Both models are normalized
around the same steady state point.
Households
β Discount Factor 1.04−1/4
γ Inverse Frisch Elasticity 1
σc Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 1
υ Leisure Scaling Constant 0.84
Firms
η Price Elasticity of Demand 6
θ Calvo Parameter 0.75
δ Depreciation Rate 1.11/4 − 1
ψ Investment Adjustment Costs 2.5
α0 Normalized Capital Income Share 0.4
σ Elasticity of Factor Substitution [0.4, 1, 1.4]
ρ Shock Auto-Regressive Parameter 0.95
Monetary policy
π Steady State Inflation 1
αpi Taylor Coefficient on Inflation 1.1
αy Taylor Coefficient on Output Gap 0.0
αr Taylor Coefficient on Lagged Interest Rate 0.0
Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Figures 1 to 4 depict the dynamic responses of selected variables to a per-
sistent one percentage point increase in εKt and ε
H
t in the standard RBC and NK
models, respectively.15, 16 For the NK model, we additionally show the responses of
inflation, nominal interest rates, and real marginal costs. The shocks are conducted
14We relax this in Appendix A, where we analyze the sensitivity to changes in the monetary
policy parameters. D also presents results using optimal policy.
15We also computed dynamic responses for the Hicks-neutral shock εHt (see Appendix E).
16Both models were solved and simulated using first-order approximation methods around
their non-stochastic steady state using Dynare, Juillard (2009).
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against the parameters values shown in Table 1 with the substitution variations
σ ∈ (0.4, 1, 1.4). Variations in σ, recall, are admissible in our framework since we
expressed the supply side in normalized form.
Summarizing, the effect of the positive technology shocks is to stimulate output,
consumption and investment. Movements in factor income shares (excluding Cobb
Douglas, where shares are constant) are symmetrical and, following Section 2.2,
“favor” either factor depending on the source of the technology improvement and
whether factors are gross complements or substitutes.
The figures thus verify that the sign of the hours response on impact depends on
sign {σ − 1}. Factor shares and relative prices (marginal productivities) behave as
anticipated. Differences in consumption and investment responses corresponding
to alternative substitution values are, in turn, explained by, inter alia, investment
reactions to changes in relative marginal productivities of capital and labor.
As expected, where qualitative differences may arise lies in the hours response.
Furthermore, these differences arise not only across the models but also within
them. Whilst capital-augmenting technology-hours impacts appear positive in the
standard RBC model, labor-augmenting technology-hours impacts appear negative
in the NK one. So far, these results - summarized in the diagonal of Table 2 -
appear in line with expectations. However, the off-diagonal elements confirm that
the models are capable of generating technology-hours impacts of either sign.17 For
example, for the RBC model, when the substitution elasticity is 0.4, a negative
impact results. For the NK model, the same elasticity induces a positive response.
RBC NK
dHt
dzKt
> 0 ⋚ 0
dHt
dzH
⋚ 0 < 0
Table 2: Sign Responses
These figures, note, only give a snapshot of our results. They confirm that both
models can generate ambiguous responses even for standard parameterizations. In
the following section we give a more analytic and generalized interpretation of
the technology-hours response in the models. It transpires that the response has
threshold characteristics such that technology-hours responses may change sign (a
key determinant of which is the value of the substitution elasticity and the source
of the technology shock and their interaction with other model features).
To anticipate some of those more general interactions, we perform some ad-
ditional analysis. Figures 5a to 5d analyze the impact response of hours along
17The negative hours response for the RBC model with labor-augmenting shocks and the
positive one for capital-augmenting shocks in the NK model are more pronounced the lower is
the value of the substitution elasticity.
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Figure 1: RBC model - Capital Augmenting Shock
a σ ∈ (0, 2] support, with a steady-state capital income share of α0 = 0.4 (the
baseline) and α0 = 0.7. The latter value is admittedly counter factual, but its use
illustrates quite well the threshold characteristics involved. For the RBC model,
5a shows that for all σ values sufficiently above α0, the labor-augmenting/hours
sign flips from negative to positive. For the NK model, it is the capital-augmenting
shock that switches sign but as the capital share increases (compare plots (d) to
(c)), the threshold point moves inwards.
6 Technology and Hours: Threshold Rules
The simulation evidence suggests that for both canonical models the sign response
of hours may change for empirically relevant parameter values of the model. We
now derive analytical rules determining the sign of the technology-hours impact.
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Note: Hours Impact when σ = 0.4 is negative (at -0.00189)
Figure 2: RBC model - Labor Augmenting Shock
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Figure 3: NK model - Capital Augmenting Shock
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Figure 4: NK model - Labor Augmenting Shock
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1278
December 2010
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
x 10−3
σ
ho
ur
s
Hours on impact with ρ=0.95, α=0.4 and varying σ
 
 
k−aug
l−aug
(a) Sensitivity for σ with α = 0.4, RBC Model
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(b) Sensitivity for σ with α = 0.7, RBC Model
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(c) Sensitivity for σ with α = 0.4, NK Model
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(d) Sensitivity for σ with α = 0.7, NK Model
Figure 5: Changes in σ and α
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We first derive the rule for the more general case of the NK model, which nests
the RBC case when prices are flexible and markets are perfectly competitive. The
rule reveals some important features usually bypassed by the existing literature.
However, to enhance the intuition, we then present the rule for the simpler RBC
case under particular assumptions about consumption smoothing. We then frame
our discussion (algebraically and graphically) in terms of the effect of technology
shocks on labor demand and supply across the two models, and under a variety of
parameter configurations.
6.1 The General Hours-Technology Rule
Without loss of generality, we normalize supply around the following steady-state:
Y0 = H0 = 1 ⇒ K0 =
α0
r0
, w0 = 1− α0 and C0 = Y0 − δK0 =
r0−δα0
r0
. This implies
that, around our baseline steady state, dYt = dYt/Y0 = d log Yt. For simplicity, we
abstract from Hicks-neutral shocks (zHt =0).
18
Consider now the full NK model (of which the standard RBC model is a limiting
case). Although the labor supply function is common to both models, a crucial
difference is that Calvo price stickiness, θ ∈ (0, 1), activates the working of the
marginal cost channel into NK labor demand.
Zero profits in the steady state imply χ = Y0
η−1
. Taking this into account,
together with normalization, allows us to write production function (34) as:
Yt =
(
η
η − 1
)[
α0
(
ez
K
t
r0
α0
Kt−1
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− α0)
(
ez
H
t Ht
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
−
1
η − 1
(49)
⇒ d log Yt =
(
η
η − 1
)
d logCESt =
(
η
η − 1
)[
α0dz
K
t + (1− α0)
(
dzHt + d logHt
)]
(50)
To proceed, note that the rhs of (15) is the normalized CES condition for FH
and, hence, on the basis of the NK marginal cost equation (38), the FOC for labor,
we can write,
d logwt =
σ − 1
σ
dzHt +
1
σ
d logCESt −
1
σ
d logHt + d logmct (51)
Now (50) and (51) imply the following labor demand relation:
d logwt = d logmct +
α0
σ
dzKt +
σ − α0
σ
dzHt −
α0
σ
d logHt. (52)
18These are examined in Appendix E.
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Equations (28) and (30), in turn, imply the labor supply relation:
d logwt = γd logHt + σcd logCt. (53)
The equilibrium change in hours, thus, can be found by combining (52) and
(53). After some transformations, this yields:
d logHt =
1
Υ
[
d logmct +
α0
σ
dzKt +
σ − α0
σ
dzHt − σcd logCt
]
, (54)
where Υ = γσ+α0
σ
.
The impact effect of technology shocks on equilibrium hours is then given by:
d logHt
dzHt
=
1
Υ
[
d logmct
dzHt
+
σ − α0
σ
− σc
d logCt
dzHt
]
. (55)
d logHt
dzKt
=
1
Υ
[
d logmct
dzKt
+
α0
σ
− σc
d logCt
dzKt
]
, (56)
Given that Υ > 0, the sign of the technology-hours correlation depends on the
signs of the elements in brackets in (55) and (56). The first two elements in both
expressions reflect the impact of shocks through labor demand shifts: changes in
the marginal cost and changes in the marginal product of labor (through both
increased output and factor substitution). The third element reflects the impact
of shocks through changes in labor supply decisions. Recall that labor supply
increases only if wages change faster than consumption (weighted by the coefficient
of relative risk aversion).
Given the potential relevance of the reaction of consumption, we can develop
further (55) and (56) so as to enhance the intuition. For a given shock dzit (i =
H,K), around the baseline steady state, we know that:
d logCt
dzit
=
d logCt
d log Yt
·
d log Yt
dzit
=
dCt
dYt
Y0
C0
·
d log Yt
dzit
=
mpct
apc
·
d log Yt
dzit
(57)
where mpct is the marginal propensity to consume, and apc is the average propen-
sity to consume in the baseline steady state period (C0/Y0 > 0). We can then
substitute d log Yt
dzit
in this expression by making use of (50). The resulting expres-
sion can then be used in conjunction with (55) and (56). This yields the expressions
for the impact of both shocks as functions of the parameters of the model, mpct,
and the reaction of the marginal cost:
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d logHt
dzHt
=
1
Υ + σc
mpct
apc
φ(1− α0)
[
d logmct
dzHt
+
σ − α0
σ
− σc
mpct
apc
φ(1− α0)
]
. (58)
d logHt
dzKt
=
1
Υ + σc
mpct
apc
φ(1− α0)
[
d logmct
dzKt
+
α0
σ
− σc
mpct
apc
φα0
]
, (59)
where φ = η
η−1
> 1.
Now we are in a position to establish the threshold values for σ that would
imply a change in the sign of the response in hours, our general threshold rules:19
d logHt
dzHt
> 0 if σ > α0
1+
d logmct
dzH
t
−σc
mpct
apc
φ(1−α0)
; (60)
d logHt
dzKt
> 0 if σ < α0
σc
mpct
apc
φα0−
d logmct
dzK
t
. (61)
The key margins for the rules are the σ−α0 wedge, the capital income share, risk
aversion and the response of the marginal propensity to consume. The latter two,
though, are linked since the higher is σc (equivalently, the lower is the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution), the less able are agents to translate income gains into
a smooth consumption profile and, thus, ceteris paribus, the higher is the impact
of the marginal propensity to consume. The latter, as we shall discuss below,
is also strongly related to the persistence of shocks as well as to the strength of
investment adjustment costs.
Both expressions (60) and (61) highlight the fact that the responses of hours
can take any sign depending on the kind of shock hitting the economy and the deep
parameters of the model. The threshold, however, appears to be a complicated
expression. We will make more sense of it in the next two sections when presenting
simplified rules for the RBC model and a graphical interpretation.
6.2 The Simple Hours-Technology Rule
Consider the standard RBC model (no investment adjustment costs, perfect com-
petition, no price stickiness). Thus, φ → 1 and d logmct = 0. The simplified
threshold rules for the substitution elasticity then become:
19We assume that the expression outside the brackets is positive. Since Υ is positive, then
this will be the case so long as mpct is positive (or a small negative number). Also, the rule for
labor-augmenting shocks holds if
[
1 + d logmct
dzH
t
− σc
mpct
apc
φ(1− α0)
]
> 0 which is almost sure to
be the case.
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d logHt
dzHt
> 0 if σ > α0
1−σc
mpct
apc
(1−α0) (62)
d logHt
dzKt
> 0 if σ < 1
σc
mpct
apc
(63)
Accordingly, we can now rationalize the responses of hours found in our baseline
calibration and summarized in Table 2 for the RBC model. If the consumption
smoothing motive is strong, which will depend on the persistence of shocks in the
RBC model (and also the investment adjustment costs in the NK model), then
mpct will be small. This implies that
d logHt
dzKt
> 0 for almost all empirically relevant
values of σ.
For d logHt
dzHt
we have a positive response for σ̟ > α0 where ̟ = 1− σc
mpct
apc
(1−
α0). If the consumption smoothing motive was such that mpct → 0, then ̟ → 1,
and the threshold value for σ would simply be α0. This case would imply that the
shock has a negligible effect on labor supply and all changes in hours are driven by
changes in labor demand. For the labor-augmenting case, the shock has a factor
substitution effect on labor demand equal to σ−1
σ
, and an output effect equal to
1−α0
σ
. The sign of the sum of these effects on labor demand will then depend on
sign [σ − α0].
20
For the NK case, in turn, we need to consider the effects of shocks on the real
marginal cost. For the parameter values used (and for most parameterizations),
the real marginal cost falls after a technology shock. Looking at expressions (60)
and (61), it is easy to see that we can now find a switching sign for the capital-
augmenting shock. For the labor-augmenting shock, sign changes may still happen,
but it is most likely that σ will be below the threshold.
7 Hours and Technology:
A Labor Demand and Supply Interpretation
Consider again the labor demand and supply schedules arising under flexible prices.
From (52) and (53), considering the flexible prices RBC case, we obtain:
d logHDt = −
σ
α0
d logwt +
(
σ − α0
α0
)
dzHt + dz
K
t (64)
20In other words, as discussed below, this arises if there is complementarity between labor and
labor-augmenting technical change. However, this property is not sufficient to generate positive
hours changes to labor-augmenting shocks as should be clear from (62) and (63).
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d logHSt =
1
γ + σc
mpct
apc
(1− α0)
{
d logwt − σc
mpct
apc
[
(1− α0) dz
H
t + α0dz
K
t
]}
(65)
Straightforwardly, these two schedules can be graphed in the hours-wage space
and the resulting shifts from changes in shocks and parameters analyzed accord-
ingly. This is done in Section 7.3. Before then however, we analyze each schedule
in turn.
7.1 Technology Shocks and Hours Demand
Whilst the effect of capital-augmenting shocks on labor demand is independent
of factor substitution, whether positive labor-augmenting shocks increase labor
demand depends on whether the substitution elasticity exceeds the capital income
share.
As mentioned, this property arises if there is complementarity between labor
demand and labor-augmenting technical progress, ∂
2Y
∂ΓH∂H
> 0 and is straightfor-
ward to show.21 Complementarity, though, is neither necessary nor sufficient to
produce a positive hours response following dzHt > 0 since the net effect depends
on labor supply reactions and - in the NK case - the effect of the reaction of real
marginal costs on labor demand.
For the familiar cases of Cobb-Douglas (respectively, Leontief) this effect is
always positive (negative). Note, though, that a labor-augmenting technology
shock will decrease labor demand within the interval σ ∈ [0, α0).
In the Leontief case, labor demand is unresponsive to real wages (as expected
under a fixed-proportions production) and falls one-for-one with positive labor aug-
menting technical improvements. Only positive capital-augmenting shocks raise
labor demand (one-for-one).
7.2 Technology Shocks and Hours Supply
Looking at equation (65), shifts in labor supply depend on the Frisch-elasticity
and risk aversion. They also depend on the endogenous responses of marginal con-
sumption decisions. In the conventional mpct > 0 case, labor supply is positively
21Given production function (1), if labor-augmenting technical progress raises labor demand
we would have,
∂2Y
∂ΓH∂H
= f (κ)− κf ′ (κ) + κ2f ′′ (κ) > 0 (f1)
Exploiting the definition of the substitution elasticity (equation (2)) and noting that α = κf
′(κ)
f(κ) ,
it follows that σ − α = f
′(κ)
f(κ)
[
f (κ)− κf ′ (κ) + κ2f ′′ (κ)
]
, which when abstracting from f
′(κ)
f(κ) >
0 retrieves (f1).
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related to the real wage but is decreasing in both technical progress terms (the
latter reflects the familiar dominance of the income effect over the substitution
effect).22
For the most part, the strength of the mpc responses depend on the values
of investment adjustment costs and risk aversion and also on how persistent the
technology shocks are.23 As equation (26) shows, investment adjustment costs
inhibit capital accumulation and hence future consumption possibilities. Such
costs raise the trade-off between current and future consumption in favor of the
former. In the limit of infinite costs, the investment/saving motive disappears,
leaving all extra income to be consumed, mpc→ 1.
However, even without such costs, consumption smoothing works to decrease
the initial fraction of income consumed. When technology shocks are temporary,
mpct is positive and small with all feasible parameters.
24 Euler equation (12)
reminds us that current consumption depends positively on future consumption
and negatively on future capital productivity. Via (16), current output and the
marginal product of capital increase inducing a positive capital-stock effect. If the
shock is temporary, most of the positive output effect rapidly disappears while
the increased capital stock remains persistently at a higher level. Hence, next-
period marginal product of capital decreases marginally below the steady state.
Because of the increasing next-period consumption and the decreasing next-period
marginal product of capital, current consumption rises.
7.3 A Graphical Analysis
For simplicity, we use the RBC case for a graphical analysis. With logHt on
the vertical axis and logwt on the horizontal, the labor demand schedule (64) is
always downward sloping with the slope converging towards the horizontal (i.e.,
flattening) as σ → 0. With γ > 0 and, at least, mpct ≥ 0, the labor supply
schedule is upward sloping.25
22In the context of a permanent (or highly persistent) productivity shock the consumption
effect is ambiguous: future marginal product of capital increases with a negative impact on
current period consumption. The higher is the intertemporal substitution (i.e. the inverse of risk
aversion σc) the stronger is that negative effect raising the possibility that mpct < 0 (e.g., agents
deny themselves current consumption to accelerate the transition to a higher level of capital and
income).
23Accordingly, it is worth stressing that even though our emphasis is on the initial hours
response, this response is nonetheless determined by the entire dynamic trajectory of the model,
its forward-lookingness and shock persistence.
24The following is based on extensive simulation exercises. Tables analyzing a wide range of
cases are provided in Appendix C.
25A negative slope is also possible but that would require that mpct < −γ
apc
σc(1−α0)
which
appears unlikely.
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7.3.1 The Labor Augmenting Shock
As regards a labor augmenting shock the relative size of the substitution elasticity
and the capital income share is crucial in two ways. If σ >(<) α0 (see Figures
6a and 6b), then (i) the negative slope exceeds (is below) unity, in absolute value,
and (ii) the shift of the demand schedule is upwards (downwards) in response to
a positive labor augmenting shock.
Regarding supply reactions, as already discussed, in the context of a temporary
shock, the marginal propensity to consume is always small and positive implying
an upward-sloping labor supply (Figure 7a). However, when coupled with a
permanent (or highly persistent) shock and/or low risk aversion the mpc-reaction
is more likely to be negative. This steepens labor supply compared to Figure 7a
and a positive labor-augmenting shock shifts labor supply upwards (Figure 7b).
Accordingly, we conclude there are two unambiguous sign cases. Combining
the cases of Figures 6a and 7b - i.e. both demand and supply shift up - the
hours-technology impact is positive. This is so when σ ≥ α0 and mpct < 0.
Combining Figures 6b and 7a cases - i.e., both curves shift downwards - the
hours-technology impact is negative. This is so when σ < α0 and mpct > 0.
In turn, combining the cases described by Figures 6a and 7a, on one hand,
and 6b and 7b, on the other, results in an ambiguous hours sign. In both cases,
the sign depends, besides the relative sizes of the shifts, also on the relative slopes of
the demand and supply curves. Empirically, the former case, i.e. the combination
of Figure 6a and 7a, appears by far the more relevant. In that case, it is clear
that the more σ exceeds α0 the more probable it is that the positive upward shift
of labor demand dominates the downward shift of labor supply.
However, σ → ∞ does not guarantee a positive technology-hours impact. On
the demand side, while the widening of the σ − α0 wedge increases the upward
shift of demand, the downward slope of the demand curve steepens as σ rises and
compensates, at least partly, the rightward shift in the intersection point of the
demand and the supply curves.
The supply-curve, in turn, becomes flatter and its downward shift larger the
higher the mpct, on one hand, and the higher the risk aversion, on the other.
We know that the rising adjustment costs raise mpct towards unity. This flattens
the upward slope of the supply curve and increases the size of its downward shift.
Hence, with sufficiently high mpct and risk aversion the downward shift of the sup-
ply curve dominates the upward shift of demand even if the latter shift approaches
infinity. This case is depicted by Figure 8.
7.3.2 The Capital Augmenting Shock
Positive capital augmenting shocks shift the demand curve always upwards. Inde-
pendently from the size of substitution elasticity or other model parameters, the
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a)   > 0 b)   < 0
Figure 6: Changes in labor demand.
semi-elasticity of the labor demand with respect to the capital augmenting shock
is unity.
Hence, the hours impact from the capital-augmenting shock is unambiguously
positive only if the mpc-impact is negative and both the demand and supply curves
shift upwards. As discussed earlier, this requires that the shock is highly persistent
and risk aversion not too high. In all other cases, labor demand shifts upward
and labor supply downwards and the sign of the shift of the intersection point is
ambiguous.
However, we know that the downward slope of the demand curve steepens when
σ increases and that the upward shift of the demand curve remains the same as a
response to a capital augmenting shock. Hence, when the downward shift of the
supply curve is coupled with the upward shift of two alternative demand curves,
the equilibrium related to the steeper demand curve is to the left and downside of
the intersection point corresponding to the less steeply downwards sloping demand
curve. These cases are depicted in Figure 9a and 9b where the initial equilibrium
point is at point A and the two alternative equilibria after the shock are at point
B for high (panel a) and low (panel b) values of σ.
This implies that when substitution elasticity is low (i.e. labor demand is flat)
the possibility that the hours-technology impact of the capital augmenting shock
is positive increases compared to the case when substitution elasticity is higher
(i.e. demand is steep).
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a) mpct > 0 b) mpct < 0
Figure 7: Changes in labor supply.
7.4 Labor Demand and Supply in the NK Model
The impact effects of technology shocks on labor demand and supply are defined
by equations (52) and (53), the latter common to both models. Price stickiness,
however, implies that real marginal costs deviate from their steady-state level and
affect labor demand. Interestingly the marginal cost channel affects the shift of
the demand curve but not its slope. The crucial questions are
(i) whether marginal cost reactions strengthen or compensate the shift effects
that could otherwise occur without price stickiness, and;
(ii) how big these effects are.
There is no clear-cut answer to the first issue and, in fact, as our numerical
analysis (Appendix C) indicates, real marginal costs may, depending on the values
of model parameters, either increase or decrease as a response to technology shocks.
The answer to the second issue is more clear-cut because the importance of the
marginal cost channel is by definition positively related to Calvo-parameter θ.
Thus with small θ, the marginal cost channel, independently from the sign of the
effect, has only a minor effect on the shift of the demand curve and therefore
our previous analysis remain qualitatively essentially unchanged. The importance
of the marginal cost channel strengthens as θ → 1. However, to validate even
approximately the conventional wisdom that the hours impact of labor augmenting
shock is negative, would require that only a small deviation of θ from zero suffices
to render the marginal cost channel dominating and that with a very wide range of
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Figure 8: Labor augmenting shock: σ > α0 and mpct > 0.
feasible parameter values of the model the effect of this channel on labor demand
is negative.
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Figure 9: Capital augmenting shock.
To provide further evidence regarding this point, Figure 10 plots the impact
effect of both technology shocks in the NK model using the baseline values of the
parameters in Table 1 but changing simultaneously the Calvo parameter (θ) and
the investment adjustment cost parameter (ψ). Parameter ψ is important as it
affects the marginal propensity to consume. One result worth mentioning is that,
for capital-augmenting shocks with low values of σ, the response remains positive
even for high values of θ and for all values of ψ considered. It is also noticeable
that when investment adjustment costs are low, very high levels of price rigidity
generate a positive rather than negative hours effect for high σ values.
8 Some Robustness analysis
The appendices provide a wide range of robustness exercises. For reasons of space,
we do not devote much space commenting them here. Appendix A reports the
impact response of hours varying several key parameters of the model. Appendix
B derives the labor supply equation and the threshold rules for non-separable
utility. This an important case as it has been used widely in the literature given
its compatibility with no secular trend in the share of hours allocated to work.
Appendix D presents the results from a model in which monetary policy is optimal,
and not derived from a simple non-optimized Taylor-type rule. The results show
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(d) L-aug σ = 1.4
Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis in the NK model on the “impact”of Hours for Calvo
parameter and Investment Adjustment Costs
that the change in sign in the NK model from both types of shocks becomes more
pronounced than in the baseline calibration. Combining these results with those
in Appendix A presenting variations in the interval αpi ∈ [1.1 3.0], we can see that
the Taylor coefficient is not crucial to determine the sign of the response of hours.26
Finally, Appendix E presents the IRF’s for Hicks-neutral shocks, from which we
had abstracted in the previous sections for simplicity.
26Taylor rule coefficients may, of course, change the hours-technology impact correlation in
larger models (e.g., Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2003)).
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The results from these exercises simply reflect, quantitatively, the mechanisms
discussed in sections 6 and 7, and confirm that our results are robust to alterna-
tive policy and preferences specifications. It is worth stressing that we have also
considered the effects of highly persistent and permanent shocks.
9 A Time-Varying Correlation?
Potentially, our study can help interpret some recent evidence that has suggested
that technology-hours responses are time-varying. Fisher (2006), Fernald (2007),
and Gambetti (2006), amongst others, report changes in the impact of technology
shocks since the mid 1960s. Technology shocks appear to have a strong negative
hours effect before the 1980s which then become almost insignificant (with another
possible change in the mid-1990s).27 At the same time, the dynamics of the labor
share in the US show a sharp decrease after the early 1980s and then a steady
but slow increase until the mid 1990s. It is then likely that shocks that reduce the
labor share were more prominent in the 1980s as suggested by theories of “directed
technical change” (Acemoglu (2002)) if firms introduce technologies that reduce
the use of the factors with a larger cost share.28
Thus, for an observed evolution of factor volumes, prices and income shares -
and preferred σ - we may back out the sequence of labor- and capital-augmenting
technology shocks consistent with that evolution. Accordingly, it is entirely plau-
sible that the response of hours to technology shocks would be time-varying if the
technology shocks are themselves time varying in their relative intensity. The value
of the substitution elasticity will matter for the transmission of those shocks, and
indeed may itself change over time, or, at the least, will differ across countries.29
In the same vein, if the introduction of certain production methods (e.g., IT
technologies) changed the adjustment cost or depreciation rate of capital, this can
have an impact on the response of hours as can easily be seen in the derivation
of our threshold rules. Such changes modify the proportion of output devoted to
saving, hence affecting the response of hours for given parameter values.30 Thus,
27Results differ by study but, in general, changes on the impact response can be observed
around 1973, 1982 and also the first half of the 1990s
28McAdam and Willman (2008) develop a similar argument for the euro area.
29Muredduy and Strauch (2010) report that time-variations in sectoral substitution elasticities
for the US and euro area map to changes in the share of ICT investment.We may also recall
the Jones short-run/long run arguments relating to the substitution elasticity. Similarly, Yuhn
(1991), following the “La Grandville (1989b) hypothesis”, examined whether the high growth
rate of east Asian countries was due, not to higher technical progress, but to a higher elasticity
of substitution.
30Depreciation rates have trended upwards in recent years - see Evans (2000). This is compat-
ible with the commonly-held view that the share of equipment in capital has increased while the
share of structures has decreased and hence investment is characterized by shorter mean lives.
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our analysis may help interpret some of the time-varying evidence reported and
provide a model-based foundation to such approaches.
10 Conclusions
We re-examined the impact of technology shocks on hours worked in business cycle
models. The usual interpretation being that, in a Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model, hours increase after a positive technology shock but initially fall in a New
Keynesian (NK) one. This difference has been taken as a means of empirically
discriminating between different theories of business-cycle fluctuations and remains
a key controversy in macroeconomics.
Given the evidence, we argued that it is no longer defensible for business-cycle
models to ignore non-unitary factor substitution and, by implication, factor-biased
technical change; Cobb-Douglas is typically rejected by the data, and factor shares
display important short- and medium-run fluctuations which, by definition, cannot
be captured by unitary elasticity models.
Further, we demonstrated that introducing a CES supply with differing substi-
tution possibility requires “normalization” for the calibration of dynamic general
equilibrium models. By using normalized CES production functions, we re-stated
that technology shocks can be either capital or labor saving. To give a flavor of
the sensitivities involved, we showed that, in the standard RBC model, capital-
augmenting shocks yield positive hours responses, whilst labor-augmenting shocks
can lead to responses of either sign. In the standard NK model, however, labor-
augmenting shocks yield negative responses and capital-augmenting shocks were
ambiguous.
However, more generally, we derived threshold rules for the determination of the
technology-hours sign on impact. In each model and shock case, we showed that
there exists some value of the elasticity of substitution whereby a given technology-
hours impact changed sign. The key margins - other than the substitution elasticity
itself and the factor bias of technology shocks - are the capital share, risk aversion,
and the marginal propensity to consume. The latter essentially boils down to how
persistent shocks are and the strength of investment adjustment costs. It is also
important to stress that variations in these parameters prove to be much more
important than variations in the degree of price rigidity when determining the
sign of the response. These margins are then interpreted using a simple labor
supply and demand framework.
We conclude that the impact of technology shocks on hours worked can hardly
be taken as evidence in support of any particular business-cycle model. This
is not to say that empirical evidence cannot discriminate between models only
that concentrating on the hours response may lead to ambiguous or inconclusive
42
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1278
December 2010
evidence. Consequently, researchers may consider a wider class of discriminatory
metrics and try to understand better the entire response space of their model.
Finally, our threshold rule may help shed light on possible time-variation in the
hours-technology correlation. This is potentially a useful insight since much of the
literature appears motivated by concerns of statistical fit rather than uncovering
the underlying economic mechanisms. In our analysis, time variations may result
from (i) time variation in the relative intensity of labor and capital augmenting
shocks and (ii) time-variations in parameters (the substitution elasticity being
prime among them).
These results open important new avenues for research. For instance, if it is not
satisfactory for business-cycle models to assume unitary factor substitution, the
practice implemented here of appropriately normalizing the supply side for calibra-
tion of DSGE models should become standard and related sensitivities analyzed.
Moreover, although theoretical, our results can have empirical implications. We
might, for instance, be able to exploit changes in factor income shares to identify
different sorts of technology shocks in modeling and SVAR analysis. The models
presented here can also serve as a benchmark to study the business cycle properties
of movements in factor shares.
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Technical Appendices
A Sensitivity graphs
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(a) Sensitivity for ρ with σ = 0.4, RBC Model
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(b) Sensitivity for ρ with σ = 1.4, RBC Model
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(c) Sensitivity for ρ with σ = 0.4, NK Model
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(d) Sensitivity for ρ with σ = 1.4, NK Model
Figure 11: Sensitivity analysis for ρ
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(a) Sensitivity for σc with σ = 0.4, RBC Model
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(b) Sensitivity for σc with σ = 1.4, RBC Model
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(c) Sensitivity for σc with σ = 0.4, NK Model
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(d) Sensitivity for σc with σ = 1.4, NK Model
Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis for σc
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(a) Sensitivity for γ with σ = 0.4, RBC Model
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
γ
ho
ur
s
Hours on impact with σ
c
=1, σ=1.4 and varying γ
 
 
k−aug
l−aug
(b) Sensitivity for γ with σ = 1.4, RBC Model
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(c) Sensitivity for γ with σ = 0.4, NK Model
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(d) Sensitivity for γ with σ = 1.4, NK Model
Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis for γ
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(a) Sensitivity for αpi when σ = 0.4
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(b) Sensitivity for αpi when σ = 1.4
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
x 10−3
αy
ho
ur
s
Hours on impact with α
pi
=1.1, α
r
=0, σ=0.4 and varying αy
 
 
k−aug
l−aug
(c) Sensitivity for αy when σ = 0.4
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(d) Sensitivity for αy when σ = 1.4
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(e) Sensitivity for αr when σ = 0.4
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(f) Sensitivity for αr when σ = 1.4
Figure 14: Sensitivity analysis in the NK model for monetary policy parameters
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(a) Sensitivity for θ with σ = 0.4, NK Model
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(b) Sensitivity for θ with σ = 1.4, NK Model
Figure 15: Sensitivity analysis for θ
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(a) Sensitivity for ψ with σ = 0.4, NK Model
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(b) Sensitivity for ψ with σ = 1.4, NK Model
Figure 16: Sensitivity analysis for ψ
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B Threshold with non-separable preferences
In the non-separable case, we define the utility function as,
U (Ct, Ht) =
[
Cγt (T −Ht)
1−γ]1−σc
1− σc
(B.1)
where T represents the total number of hours available in each period and thus
ℜ = T−H
H
represents the ratio of non-market-to-market activities. Corresponding
to the steady state H0 = 1, which we used earlier, a natural choice of T would be
around 3, i.e. ℜ ≈ 2. Note, we could just as easily have set T = 1 as commonly
done, although for familiarity with our earlier case, we chose H0 = 1. This yields
the following labor supply equation (in log-difference form):
d logwt = −d log (T −Ht) + d logCt. (B.2)
The labor demand equation is obviously not affected by the change in the utility
function. Around the steady state, ℜ = T−H
H
and hence the growth of wt can be
expressed as:
d logwt =
1
ℜ
d log (T −Ht) + d logCt. (B.3)
This implies that the expression for the labor supply schedule (equation (65) in
the main text) now becomes:
d logHt =
1
1/ℜ+ mpct
apc
φ(1− α0)
[
d logwt −
mpct
apc
φ
(
α0dz
K
t + (1− α0)dz
H
t
)]
.
(B.4)
It is clear that the rest of the analysis in the main text then remains the same,
as this case of utility function is simply a limiting case of the separable utility
function with σc = 1 and γ = 1/ℜ.
1 Hence, the new general threshold rule now
1This is logical as this form of utility function goes back to Prescott (1986) and is restricted
to display both constant intertemporal and unit intra-temporal elasticities of substitution. This
function implies an elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure of 1 and is consis-
tent with the observation that leisure per capita has shown virtually no secular trend. 1/σc > 0
is the elasticity of substitution between different date composite commodities Cγt (1−Ht)
1−γ
where γ is the consumption share parameter.
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becomes:
d logHt
dzHt
> 0 if σ > α0
1+
d logmct
dzH
t
−
mpct
apc
φ(1−α0)
. (B.5)
d logHt
dzKt
> 0 if σ < α0mpct
apc
φα0−
d logmct
dzK
t
(B.6)
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C Numerical simulation tables
The general threshold conditions (60) and (61) can be written in the following
form form:
d logHt
dzHt
> 0
if mpct −
apc
φσc(1− α0)
d logmct
dzHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
mpct-χmct
< apc
φ(1−α0)σc
(
1− α0
σ
)
;
(C.1)
d logHt
dzKt
> 0
if mpct −
apc
φσcα0
d logmct
dzKt︸ ︷︷ ︸
mpct-υmct
< apc
φσcσ
.
(C.2)
Hence, these two conditions can be described with help of two curves. The
right hand sides of both (C.1) and (C.2) are determined solely by the parameters
of the model. The functional forms of the right hand sides with respect to σ
are hyperbolas. The hyperbola corresponding to the labor-augmenting threshold
condition increases from minus infinity to its horizontal asymptote apc
φ(1−α0)σc
, when
σ grows from zero to infinity. The hyperbola related to the capital augmenting
threshold condition is downward sloping and it falls from infinity to zero, when σ
grows from zero to infinity. The left-hand sides, in turn, represent the endogenous
reactions of the marginal propensity to consume (mpct) and the real marginal cost
(mct) and, hence, are known a priori only in some special cases as depicted in the
main text.
In the RBC-model real marginal costs (mct) do not react to shocks and, hence,
conditions (C.1) and (C.2) simplify to,
d logHt
dzHt
> 0 if mpct <
apc
φ(1−α0)σc
(
1− α0
σ
)
; (C.3)
d logHt
dzKt
> 0 if mpct <
apc
φσcσ
. (C.4)
Tables A1-A5 present the mpct and mpct-χmct reactions to a labor augment-
ing shock, when σ takes the range of values (0.3, 0.9, 1.4, 2, 10) with different
combinations of other model parameters. As long-as the mpct (RBC-model) or
mpct-χmct (NK-model) response is below (above) the right hand side value of the
hyperbola with the same parameter configuration, then the hours-response to the
shock is positive (negative). This is indicated by (+) or (-) signs in the tables.
Tables A6-A10 present corresponding results for capital augmenting shocks.
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Table A1. RBC: Impact responses of mpct to a labor augmenting shock, the values of the 
hyperbola ( ) 




−
− σ
α
σα
0
0
1
1 c
apc
  and the sign of HdzdH , ( 718.0=apc , 0=Ψ  and 4.00 =α ). 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
 
Risk aversion 5.0=cσ  
Hyperbola -0.798 0.330 0.710 1.915 2.230 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.086       (-)  0.056       (+)  0.046       (+)  0.039       (+)  0.019       (+) 
95.0=ρ  -0.411       (-)  0.074       (+)  0.154       (+)  0.191       (+)  0.211       (+) 
99.0=ρ  -0.631       (-)  0.086       (+)  0.236       (+)  0.324       (+)  0.492       (+) 
1=ρ  -0.714       (-)  0.091       (+)  0.278       (+)  0.398       (+)  0.747       (+) 
 Risk aversion 1=cσ  
Hyperbola -0.399 0.665 0.855 0.958 0.1.149 
ρmpc    (dH-sign)      
0=ρ   0.067       (-)  0.040       (+)  0.032       (+)  0.027       (+)  0.013       (+) 
95.0=ρ  -0.046       (-)  0.178       (+)  0.202       (+)  0.208       (+)  0.170       (+) 
99.0=ρ  -0.109       (-)  0.293       (+)  0.372       (+)  0.415       (+)  0.461       (+) 
1=ρ  -0.135       (-)  0.357       (+)  0.479       (+)  0.561       (+)  0.813       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ  
Hyperbola -0.200 0.332 0.427 0.479 0.575 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (-)  0.027      (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.128       (-)  0.193      (+)  0.187       (+)  0.177       (+)  0.122       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.185       (-)  0.383      (+)  0.413       (+)  0.423       (+)  0.386       (+) 
1=ρ   0.213       (-)  0.516       (-)  0.599       (-)  0.658       (-)  0.853       (-) 
 Risk aversion 4=cσ  
Hyperbola -0.100 0.166 0.214 0.239 0.287 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.033       (-)  0.017       (+)  0.013       (+)  0.011      (+)  0.005       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.179       (-)  0.160       (+)  0.142       (+)  0.127       (+)  0.078       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.323       (-)  0.385       (-)  0.380       (-)  0.368       (-)  0.286       (+) 
1=ρ   0.411       (-)  0.605       (-)  0.667       (-)  0.713       (-)  0.874       (-) 
 Risk aversion 8=cσ  
Hyperbola -0.050 0.083 0.107 0.120 0.144 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.021       (-)  0.010       (+)  0.007       (+)  0.006       (+)  0.003       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.160       (-)  0.110       (+)  0.092       (+)  0.080       (+)  0.045       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.353       (-)  0.325       (-)  0.299       (-)  0.276       (-)  0.187       (-) 
1=ρ   0.517       (-)  0.654       (-)  0.704       (-)  0.742       (-)  0.886       (-) 
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Table A2. Generalized RBC ( η Finite ): Impact responses of mpct to a labor augmenting 
shock, the values of  the hyperbola ( ) 




−




 −
− σ
α
η
η
σα
0
0
11
1 c
apc
  and the sign of HdzdH , 
( 718.0=apc , 0=Ψ  and 4.00 =α ). 
 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
 
Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity ∞=η  
Hyperbola -0.200 0.332 0.427 0.479 0.575 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (-)  0.027       (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.128       (-)  0.193       (+)  0.187       (+)  0.177       (+)  0.122       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.185       (-)  0.383        (-)  0.413       (+)  0.423       (+)  0.386       (+) 
1=ρ   0.213       (-)  0.516        (-)  0.599        (-)  0.658        (-)  0.853       (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity 10=η  
Hyperbola -0.180 0.299 0.385 0.431 0.517 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.050       (-)  0.028       (+)  0.022       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.009       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.179       (-)  0.217       (+)  0.206       (+)  0.193       (+)  0.134       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.269       (-)  0.430        (-)  0.451        (-)  0.457       (-)  0.415       (+) 
1=ρ   0.312       (-)  0.575        (-)  0.650        (-)  0.703       (-)  0.878        (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity 2=η  
Hyperbola -0.100 0.166 0.214 0.239 0.287 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.059       (-)  0.032       (+)  0.025        (+)  0.022       (+)  0.013       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.383       (-)  0.319        (-)  0.288         (-)  0.265        (-)  0.198       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.584       (-)  0.611        (-)  0.603         (-)  0.593        (-)  0.541        (-) 
1=ρ   0.675       (-)  0.794        (-)  0.833         (-)  0.862        (-)  0.954        (-) 
 Risk aversion 1=cσ , price elasticity 10=η  
Hyperbola -0.359 0.598 0.769 0.862 1.034 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.069        (-)  0.042        (+)  0.033        (+)  0.028       (+)  0.014       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.038        (-)  0.217        (+)  0.233        (+)  0.233       (+)  0.188       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.021        (-)  0.362        (+)  0.428        (+)  0.463       (+)  0.496       (+) 
1=ρ   0.014        (-)  0.439        (+)  0.547        (+)  0.620       (+)  0.845       (+) 
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Table A3. Generalized RBC ( 0≠Ψ ):  Impact responses of mpct to a labor augmenting shock, 
the values of  the hyperbola ( ) 




−
− σ
α
σα
0
0
1
1 c
apc
  and the sign of HdzdH , ( 718.0=apc  and 
4.00 =α ). 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
Hyperbola -0.200 0.332 0.427 0.479 0.575 
 
Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (-)  0.027       (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.128       (-)  0.193       (+)  0.187       (+)  0.177       (+)  0.122       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.185       (-)  0.383        (-)  0.413       (+)  0.423       (+)  0.386       (+) 
1=ρ   0.213       (-)  0.516        (-)  0.599        (-)  0.658        (-)  0.853       (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 1.0=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.226       (-)  0.208       (+)  0. 202       (+)  0.198       (+)  0.189       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.220       (-)  0.286       (+)  0.281        (+)  0.272       (+)  0.219       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.271       (-)  0.462        (-)  0.491        (-)  0.502       (-)  0.471       (+) 
1=ρ   0.296       (-)  0.582        (-)  0.659        (-)  0.713       (-)  0.880       (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 1=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.665       (-)  0. 654       (-)  0.650        (-)  0.648        (-)  0.641       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.492       (-)  0.540        (-)  0.537        (-)  0.529        (-)  0.484       (+) 
99.0=ρ   0.517       (-)  0.661        (-)  0.684        (-)  0.693        (-)  0.672       (-) 
1=ρ   0.534       (-)  0.744        (-)  0.797        (-)  0.832        (-)  0.934       (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 5.2=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.816        (-)  0.810        (-)  0.808        (-)  0.806       (-)  0.802       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.625        (-)  0.663        (-)  0.660        (-)  0.654       (-)  0.616       (-) 
99.0=ρ   0.637        (-)  0.750        (-)  0.768        (-)  0775        (-)  0.759       (-) 
1=ρ   0.648        (-)  0.812        (-)  0.853        (-)  0.879       (-)  0.954       (-) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 10=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.940        (-)  0.938        (-)  0.937        (-)  0.937       (-)  0.936       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.795        (-)  0.817        (-)  0.816        (-)  0.813       (-)  0.791       (-) 
99.0=ρ   0.789        (-)  0.858        (-)  0.869        (-)  0.874       (-)  0.865       (-) 
1=ρ   0.792        (-)  0.893        (-)  0.917        (-)  0.932       (-)  0.975       (-) 
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Table A4. NK ( 0=Ψ ): Impact responses of mpct and mpct - ⋅ mct to a labor augmenting 
shock, the values of  the hyperbola ( ) 




−




 −
− σ
α
η
η
σα
0
0
11
1 c
apc
 and the sign of HdzdH , 
( 718.0=apc , 1=cσ 10=η , 4.00 =α ). 
 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
Hyperbola -0.359 0.598 0.769 0.862 1.034 
 
Calvo parameter 5.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ   0.069         0.042        0.033        0.028        0.014       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.074       (-)  0.045       (+)  0.036       (+)  0.030       (+)  0.014       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.038  0.213  0.229  0.231  0.188 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ  -0.060       (-)  0.166       (+)  0.196       (+)  0.206        (+)  0.182       (+)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.022  0.354  0.421  0.457  0.495 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ  -0.081        (-) 0.309        (+)  0.390        (+)  0.435        (+)  0.490       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.016         0.430          0.538       0.612        0.842        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ  -0.089        (-)  0.386        (+)  0.508        (+)  0.591        (+)  0.838       (+) 
 
Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ    0.069         0.042        0.033        0.028        0.014       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ    0.100       (-)  0.063       (+)  0.50       (+)  0.040       (+)  0.017       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.041  0.197  0.215  0.219  0.185 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ  -0.539        (+) -0.082       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.073        (+)  0.151       (+)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.027  0.323  0.391  0.431  0.487 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ  -0.578        (+) 0.055        (+)  0.207        (+)  0.298        (+)  0.458       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.021        0. 391         0.499       0.576        0.829        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ  -0.590        (+)  0.130        (+)  0.324       (+)  0.452        (+)  0. 805      (+) 
 
Calvo parameter 85.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ   0.069         0.042        0.033        0.028        0.014       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.163        (+)  0.108       (+)  0.083       (+)  0.066       (+)  0.023       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.045  0.166  0.186  0.194  0.179 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ  -1.740        (+) -0.693       (+) -0.422       (+) -0.259        (+)  0.072       (+)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.034  0.267  0.333  0.377  0.469 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ  -1.816        (+) -0.556       (+) -0.231        (+) -0.032        (+)  0.379       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.031        0.322          0. 423      0.503        0.798        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ  -1.835        (+) -0.476        (+)  0.111       (+)  0.123        (+)  0.722       (+) 
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Table A5. NK: Impact responses of mpct and mpct - ⋅ mct to a labor augmenting shock, the 
values of  the hyperbola ( ) 




−




 −
− σ
α
η
η
σα
0
0
11
1 c
apc
 and the sign of HdzdH , 
( 718.0=apc , 1=cσ 10=η , 4.00 =α ). 
 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
Hyperbola -0.359 0.598 0.769 0.862 1.034 
 
Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ    0.069         0.042        0.033        0.028        0.014       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ    0.100       (-)  0.063       (+)  0.50       (+)  0.040       (+)  0.017       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.042  0.194  0.213  0.218  0.185 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ  -0.538        (+) -0.084       (+)  0.017       (+)  0.072        (+)  0.151       (+)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.029  0.319  0.388  0.429  0.487 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ  -0.575        (+) 0.050        (+)  0.205        (+)  0.296        (+)  0.458       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.024        0. 386         0.495       0.574        0.829        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ  -0.587        (+)  0.125       (+)  0.321       (+)  0.450        (+)  0. 805      (+) 
 
Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 1.0=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ   0.287         0.267        0.260        0.254        0.238       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   1.315        (-) 1.492         (-) 1.529         (-)  1.550        (-) 1.590        (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.170  0.360  0.382  0.388  0.349 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   0.357        (-)  0.662        (-)  0.717        (+)  0.746        (+)  0.789       (+)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.149  0.492  0.560  0.598  0.642 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   0.315        (-)  0.681        (-)  0.750        (+)  0.788        (+)  0.849       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.141        0.558          0.659       0.724        0.900        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   0.304        (-)  0.701        (-)  0.782        (-)  0.831        (+)  0.946       (+) 
 
Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 1=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ   0.718         0.706        0.701        0.698        0.688       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   2.103       (-)  2.222        (-)  2.246        (-)  2.258       (-)  2.280        (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.492  0.625  0.638  0.641  0.610 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   0.938       (-)  1.046        (-)  1.064        (-)  1.074        (-)  1.090        (-) 
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.458  0.704  0.747  0.770  0.794 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   0.882        (-)  0.987        (-)  1.001        (-)  1.008        (-)  1.020        (+) 
mpc 1=ρ   0.447        0.747          0.809       0. 848       0.947        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   0.869       (-)  0.973        (-)  0.985       (-)  0.990        (-)  0.999        (+) 
 
Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 5.2=Ψ  
 
         (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) 
mpc 0=ρ   0.849         0.841        0.839        0.837        0.831       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   2.267        (-)  2.382        (-)  2.404         (-)  2.417       (-)  2.439       (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.644  0.737  0.746  0.748  0.726 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   1.054        (-)  1.115        (-)  1.125         (-)  1.130        (-)  1.141       (-)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   0.607  0.787  0.818  0.834  0.852 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   0.993        (-)  1.036        (-)  1.039.        (-)  1.041        (-)  1.044       (-)  
mpc 1=ρ   0.596        0.817          0.862       0.890        0.962        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   0.978        (-)  1.014        (-)  1.014         (-)  1.012        (-)  1.005       (+) 
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Table A6. RBC:  Impact responses of mpct to a capital augmenting shock, the values of the 
hyperbola
c
apc
σσ
 and the sign of KdzdH , ( 718.0=apc , 0=Ψ ). 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
 
Risk aversion 5.0=cσ  
Hyperbola 4.787 1.596 1.026 0.718 0.143 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.086       (+)  0.056       (+)  0.046       (+)  0.039       (+)  0.019       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.723       (+)  0.158       (+) -0.091       (+) -0.272       (+) -0.771       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.101       (+)  0.226       (+) -0.182       (+) -0.474       (+) -1.252       (+) 
1=ρ   1.268       (+)  0.258       (+) -0.225       (+) -0.569       (+) -1.467       (+) 
 Risk aversion 1=cσ  
Hyperbola 2.394 0.798 0.513 0.359 0.072 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.067       (+)  0.040       (+)  0.032       (+)  0.027       (+)  0.013       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.702       (+)  0.231       (+)  0.049       (+) -0.074       (+) -0.375       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.229       (+)  0.402       (+)  0.063       (+) -0.155       (+) -0.633       (+) 
1=ρ   1.515       (+)  0.498       (+)  0.070       (+) -0.197       (+) -0.754       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ  
Hyperbola 1.197 0.399 0.257 0.180 0.036 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (+)  0.027       (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.653       (+)  0.229       (+)  0.091       (+)  0.005       (+) -0.179       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.429       (-)  0.477        (-)  0.165       (+) -0.006       (+) -0.313       (+) 
1=ρ   2.035       (-)  0.622        (-)  0.215       (+) -0.013       (+) -0.378       (+) 
 Risk aversion 4=cσ  
Hyperbola 0.598 0.200 0.128 0.090 0.018 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.033       (+)  0.017       (+)  0.013       (+)  0.011       (+)  0.005       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.570       (+)  0.183       (+)  0.082       (+)  0.025       (+) -0.085       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.920       (-)  0.473       (-)  0.176       (-)  0.042       (+) -0.153       (+) 
1=ρ   4.724       (-)  0.798       (-)  0.253       (-)  0.053       (+) -0.188       (+) 
 Risk aversion 8=cσ  
Hyperbola 0.299 0.100 0.064 0.045 0.009 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.021        (+)  0.010       (+)  0.007       (+)  0.006       (+)  0.003       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.454        (-)  0.124       (-)  0.057       (+)  0.022       (+) -0.041       (+) 
99.0=ρ   5.235        (-)  0.408       (-)  0.139       (-)  0.042       (+) -0.075       (+) 
1=ρ  -3.1991         (-)  0.982       (-)  0.223       (-)  0.059       (-) -0.093       (+) 
 
                                                 
1
 Unlike everywhere else in this Table the negative sign implies here a positive consumption and 
negative income effect reflecting very strong negative impact effect on labor supply.  
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Table A7. Generalized RBC ( η Finite ): Impact responses of mpct to a capital augmenting 
shock, the values of the hyperbola 




 −
η
η
σσ
1
c
apc
 and the sign of KdzdH , ( 718.0=apc , 0=Ψ ). 
 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
 
Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity ∞=η  
Hyperbola 1.197 0.399 0.257 0.180 0.036 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (+)  0.027        (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.653       (+)  0.229        (+)  0.091       (+)  0.005       (+) -0.179       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.429       (-)  0.477        (-)  0.165       (+) -0.006       (+) -0.313       (+) 
1=ρ   2.035       (-)  0.622        (-)  0.215       (+) -0.013       (+) -0.378       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity 10=η  
Hyperbola 1.077 0.359 0.231 0.162 0.032 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.050       (+)  0.028        (+)  0.022        (+)  0.018       (+)  0.009       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.663       (+)  0.250        (+)  0.116        (+)  0.033       (+) -0.144       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.417       (-)  0.518        (-)  0.216        (+)  0.048       (+) -0.252       (+) 
1=ρ   1.983       (-)  0.715        (-)  0.281        (-)  0.056       (+) -0.305       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , price elasticity 2=η  
Hyperbola 0.598 0.200 0.128 0.090 0.018 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.059       (+)  0.032       (+)  0.025        (+)  0.022        (+)  0.013       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.709       (-)  0.343        (-)  0.224         (-)  0.151        (-)  0.002       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.352       (-)  0.679        (-)  0.417         (-)  0.266        (-) -0.005       (+) 
1=ρ   1.750       (-)  0.903        (-)  0.534         (-)  0.331        (-) -0.008       (+) 
 Risk aversion 1=cσ , price elasticity 10=η  
Hyperbola 2.154 0.718 0.462 0.323 0.064 
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.069        (+)  0.042        (+)  0.033         (+)  0.028        (+)  0.014       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.714        (+)  0.267        (+)  0.092         (+) -0.025        (+) -0.310       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.227        (+)  0.462        (+)  0.141         (+) -0.067        (+) -0522        (+) 
1=ρ   1.750        (+)  0.571        (+)  0.167         (+) -0.089        (+) -0.621       (+) 
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Table A8. Generalized RBC ( 0≠Ψ ):  Impact responses of mpct to a capital augmenting 
shock, the values of the hyperbola 
c
apc
σσ
 and the sign of KdzdH , ( 718.0=apc ). 
 
3.0=σ  9.0=σ  4.1=σ  2=σ  10=σ  
Hyperbola 1.197 0.399 0.257 0.180 0.036 
 
Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.049       (+)  0.027        (+)  0.021       (+)  0.018       (+)  0.008       (+) 
95.0=ρ   0.653       (+)  0.229        (+)  0.091       (+)  0.005       (+) -0.179       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.429       (-)  0.477        (-)  0.165       (+) -0.006       (+) -0.313       (+) 
1=ρ   2.035       (-)  0.622        (-)  0.215       (+) -0.013       (+) -0.378       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 1.0=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.226       (+)  0.208       (+)  0. 202       (+)  0.198       (-)  0.189       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.700       (+)  0.320       (+)  0.187        (+)  0.109       (+) -0.097       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.355       (-)  0.548       (-)  0.256        (+)  0.085       (+) -0.251       (+) 
1=ρ   1.828       (-)  0.713       (-)  0.303        (-)  0.076       (+) -0.327       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 1=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.665       (+)  0. 654       (-)  0.650        (-)  0.648        (-)  0.641       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.823       (+)  0.567        (-)  0.458        (-)  0.380        (-)  0.169       (+) 
99.0=ρ   1.192       (+)  0.722        (-)  0.503        (-)  0.349        (-) -0.035       (+) 
1=ρ   1.420       (-)  0.830        (-)  0.538        (-)  0.337        (-) -0.143       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 5.2=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.816        (+)  0.810        (-)  0.808        (-)  0.806       (-)  0.802       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.875        (+)  0.684        (-)  0.595        (-)  0.529       (-)  0.333       (-) 
99.0=ρ   1.133        (+)  0.797        (-)  0.622        (-)  0.490       (-)  0.110       (-) 
1=ρ   1.285        (-)  0.877        (-)  0.649        (-)  0.476       (-) -0.012       (+) 
 Risk aversion 2=cσ , Adjustment costs of investment 10=Ψ  
 
mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign) 
0=ρ   0.940        (+)  0.938        (-)  0.937        (-)  0.937       (-)  0.936       (-) 
95.0=ρ   0.935        (+)  0.830        (-)  0.777        (-)  0.734       (-)  0.594       (-) 
99.0=ρ   1.070        (+)  0.886        (-)  0.777        (-)  0.687       (-)  0.371       (-) 
1=ρ   1.150        (+)  0.931        (-)  0.790        (-)  0.671       (-)  0.237       (-) 
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Table A9. NK ( 0=Ψ ): Impact responses of mpct and mpct - ⋅mct to a capital augmenting 
shock, values of  the hyperbola   
!
"
##
$
% −
η
η
σσ
1
c
apc
 and sign of KdzdH , ( 718.0=apc , 2=cσ 10=η ). 
 3.0=σ 9.0=σ 4.1=σ 2=σ 10=σ
Hyperbola 1.077 0.359 0.231 0.162 0.032 
 Calvo parameter 5.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.050         0.028        0.022        0.018        0.009       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.058       (+)  0.030       (+)  0.023       (+)  0.019       (+)  0.009       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.672  0.247  0.113  0.033 -0.137 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   0.706       (+)  0.231       (+)  0.086       (+) -0.006        (+) -0.180       (+)    
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.465  0.518  0.209  0.046 -0.242 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   1.519        (-) 0.498        (-)  0.182       (+)  0.012        (+) -0.288       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   2.079         0.704          0.272  0.054       -0.295        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   2.142        (-)  0.694        (-)  0.246        (-)  0.020        (+) -0.342       (+) 
 Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.050         0.028        0.022        0.018        0.009       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.092       (+)  0.041       (+)  0.030       (+)  0.023       (+)  0.010      (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.722  0.231  0.101  0.030 -0.108 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   0.922       (+)  0.135       (+)  0.059       (+) -0. 165       (+) -0.366       (+)    
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.752  0.476  0.183  0.041 -0.201 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   2.069        (-) 0.402        (-)  0. 026      (+) -0.160        (+) -0.473       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   2.727        0.658          0.235       0.048       -0.251        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   3.097        (-)  0.596       (-)  0.082       (+) -0.156        (+) -0.530       (+) 
 Calvo parameter 85.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.051         0.028        0.022        0.018        0.009       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.176       (+)  0.067       (+)  0.045       (+)  0.034        (+)  0.011       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.886  0.199  0.081  0.026 -0.070 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   1.487       (-) -0.098       (+) -0.412       (+) -0.576        (+) -0.870       (+)    
mpc 99.0=ρ   3.426  0.408  0.141  0.034 -0.141 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   4.387       (-)  0.181       (+) -0.338       (+) -0.581        (+) -0.979       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ  12.304        0.567          0.179       0.039       -0.183        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ  13.427       (-)  0.378       (-) -0.288       (+) -0.578        (+) -1.039       (+) 
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Table A10. NK: Impact responses of mpct and mpct - ⋅mct to a capital augmenting shock, the 
values of  the hyperbola   
!
"
##
$
% −
η
η
σσ
1
c
apc
 and the sign of KdzdH , ( 718.0=apc , 2=cσ 10=η ). 
 3.0=σ 9.0=σ 4.1=σ 2=σ 10=σ
Hyperbola 1.077 0.359 0.231 0.162 0.032 
 Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 0=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.051         0.028        0.022        0.018        0.009       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   0.092       (+)  0.041       (+)  0.030       (+)  0.023       (+)  0.010       (+) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.751  0.229  0.100  0.030 -0.108 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   0.949       (+)  0.132       (+)  0.060       (+) -0. 166       (+) -0.366       (+)    
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.945  0.471  0.181  0.041 -0.201 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   2.262        (-) 0.397        (-)  0.024      (+) -0.160        (+) -0.473       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   3.239        0.651          0.233       0.048       -0.251        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   3.608        (-)  0.589       (-)  0.080       (+) -0.154        (+) -0.529       (+) 
 Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 1.0=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.185         0.163        0.156        0.151        0.138       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   1.364        (-)  0.838        (-)  0.722       (-)  0.656        (-)  0.523       (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.788  0.364  0.211  0.109 -0.139 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   1.022        (+)  0.519        (-)  0.365       (-)  0.269        (-)  0.062       (-)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.396  0.617  0.317  0.124 -0.327 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   1.441        (-)  0.682        (-)  0.420       (-)  0.265        (-) -0.008       (+)  
mpc 1=ρ   1.757        0.775          0.382       0.133       -0.431        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   1.724        (-)  0.799        (-)  0.462       (-)  0.267         (-) -0.013       (+) 
 Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 1=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.570       0.550        0.543        0.539        0.526      
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   2.221        (-)  1.405       (+)  1.246        (-)  0.1.158      (-)  0.987       (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.862  0.579  0.443  0.338  0.021 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   1.119        (-)  0.809       (-)  0.677        (-)  0.580         (-)  0.303       (-)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.167  0.767  0.531  0.339 -0.290 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   1.095        (-)  0.871       (-)  0.699        (-)  0.557         (-)  0.130       (-)  
mpc 1=ρ   1.310        0.873          0.587      0.347       -0.478        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   1.100        (-)  0.921       (-)  0.725        (-)  0.555         (-)  0.056       (-) 
 Calvo parameter 75.0=θ , Adjustment costs of investment 5.2=Ψ  
          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)          (dH-sign) mpc (dH-sign)          (dH-sign)
mpc 0=ρ   0.741         0.727        0.723        0.720        0.710       
mpc- ⋅ mc 0=ρ   2.438        (-)  1.599       (-)  1.438       (-)  1.349        (-)  1.177       (-) 
mpc 95.0=ρ   0.896  0.684  0.574  0.486  0.197 
mpc- ⋅ mc 95.0=ρ   1.144        (-)  0.900       (-)  0.791       (-)  0.707        (-)  0.447       (-)     
mpc 99.0=ρ   1.116  0.825  0.637  0.474 -0.135 
mpc- ⋅ mc 99.0=ρ   1.043        (+)  0.922       (-)  0.791       (-)  0.671        (-)  0.234       (-)  
mpc 1=ρ   1.218        0.906          0.681       0.476       -0.345        
mpc- ⋅ mc 1=ρ   1.010        (+)  0.950       (-)  0.807       (-)  0.666        (-)  0.123       (-) 
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Figure 17: NK model, Ramsey Optimal Monetary Policy - Capital Augmenting
Shock
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Figure 18: NK model, Ramsey Optimal Monetary Policy - Labor Augmenting
Shock
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Figure 19: NK model, Ramsey Optimal Monetary Policy - Hicks Neutral Shock
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Figure 20: RBC model - Hicks Neutral Shock
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Figure 21: NK model - Hicks Neutral Shock
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